Classification Societies and liability
When the 37 238 dwt single hull tanker Erika went down off the coast of France laden with heavy fuel oil in December 1999, the shipping industry entered an era characterised by European Union-led legislation; an increasing emphasis on transparency; increased policing by port state control (PSC); and intensified commercial pressure on tanker owners and operators, in the form of stringent vetting criteria put into place by the oil majors.
Although the loss of the Eriba most obviously impacted the tanker sector, the repercussions have spread throughout the marine industry and across the various links in the safety chain, encompassing owners, charterers, classification societies, port state control authorities, insurers, flag state administrations and others.
IACS is currently engaged in over 140 technical projects, including the creation of unified requirements on double-hull bulk carrier design; an IACS technical panel to assist the EU's new maritime body, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA); guidelines for auditors of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; and the programme for assisting Paris MoU blacklisted flags to improve their PSC track records.
LR also publishes information on its port state detention performance on its web site (www.lr.org). This information is updated on a real-time basis and highlights specific aspects which can be measured against prior performance, including number of PSC detentions; detentions against ship types; detentions related to flag state; detentions by age and country; and league tables of the most prominent and recurring detention items.
The data gathered is extremely valuable and can be used to help the industry to recognise recurring risks and to improve safety by concentrating on those items that are hazardous to operations and continually produce detentions. These items can be significant when viewed alone, but can also create a far greater hazard when occurring in combination on the same ship. Using this data, LR has the ability to benchmark the performance of individual owners' ships against the norms drawn from the entire classed fleet, helping to further enhance safety and improve quality of operation.
LR has also incorporated transparency into its business procedures, including its design, construction monitoring and surveying procedures. For example, a direct linkage between the ship's operating conditions and its design criteria is provided. This can clearly be seen with respect to the future life of the vessel, with owner, designer and class agreeing operating conditions and trading routes. Structural details are designed accordingly, and condition monitoring during the construction stage and surveying of critical areas during service life are focused to ensure criteria are met and maintained. This information is contained, for the benefit of the owner, on a datasheet which specifies precisely what has been assigned in terms of fatigue as well as structural design assessment, construction monitoring and enhanced scantlings.
This kind of transparency - transparency of practice - is just as instrumental to the enhancement of safety in shipping as outward-facing transparency, if not more so. In the wake of Eriba, class has embraced both kinds, to the overall betterment of the industry.
One of the key issues for class post Prestige is liability. While class societies have in the past been subject to legal proceedings involving owners, operators, cargo interests and others, it now appears that future cases may be brought by governments, and there is a clear hardening in attitude by European Member States with respect to pollution, especially in light of the European Commission's (EC) proposed Directive on criminalising marine pollution.
The proposal for a Directive on ship source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences, states the following: '...the proposed Directive establishes that discharges in violation of Community laws shall constitute a criminal offence and that sanctions, including criminal sanctions, are to be imposed if the persons concerned have been found to have caused or participated in the act by intent or grossly negligent behaviour.
For natural persons this may include, in the most serious cases, the deprivation of liberty. The introduction of adequate sanctions for pollution offences is particularly important in relation to pollution by shipping, as the international civil liability regimes that govern ship-source pollution incidents involve significant shortcomings with respect to their dissuasive effects.'
The proposed Directive works on the assumption that the enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 is not strong or consistent enough and that the Civil Liability Conventions and their attendant Funds do not provide enough of a deterrent to would-be polluters. The proposed Directive is aimed as much at operational discharges of oil (in tank-cleaning operations, for example) as at large pollution incidents such as those which resulted from the sinkings of the Erika and the Prestige. The EC believes that the proposed Directive would give EMSA the legal basis to enforce MARPOL more effectively within European waters.
Although the loss of the Eriba most obviously impacted the tanker sector, the repercussions have spread throughout the marine industry and across the various links in the safety chain, encompassing owners, charterers, classification societies, port state control authorities, insurers, flag state administrations and others.
Embracing transparency.
But beyond what is required by law and/or any EU or IMO Directive, class has embraced transparency as an effective means of enhancing both safety and business. IACS has made transparency a priority, placing information about its technical work programme in the public domain by publishing it on the association's web site (www.iacs.org.uk).IACS is currently engaged in over 140 technical projects, including the creation of unified requirements on double-hull bulk carrier design; an IACS technical panel to assist the EU's new maritime body, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA); guidelines for auditors of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; and the programme for assisting Paris MoU blacklisted flags to improve their PSC track records.
Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Within Lloyd's Register (LR), transparency has taken several forms. First and foremost is its online class information service, ClassDirect Live, which provides LR-classed shipowners with information on ships, shiphoard equipment, classification status, statutory certification status and increasingly ship plans and other related documentation.LR also publishes information on its port state detention performance on its web site (www.lr.org). This information is updated on a real-time basis and highlights specific aspects which can be measured against prior performance, including number of PSC detentions; detentions against ship types; detentions related to flag state; detentions by age and country; and league tables of the most prominent and recurring detention items.
The data gathered is extremely valuable and can be used to help the industry to recognise recurring risks and to improve safety by concentrating on those items that are hazardous to operations and continually produce detentions. These items can be significant when viewed alone, but can also create a far greater hazard when occurring in combination on the same ship. Using this data, LR has the ability to benchmark the performance of individual owners' ships against the norms drawn from the entire classed fleet, helping to further enhance safety and improve quality of operation.
LR has also incorporated transparency into its business procedures, including its design, construction monitoring and surveying procedures. For example, a direct linkage between the ship's operating conditions and its design criteria is provided. This can clearly be seen with respect to the future life of the vessel, with owner, designer and class agreeing operating conditions and trading routes. Structural details are designed accordingly, and condition monitoring during the construction stage and surveying of critical areas during service life are focused to ensure criteria are met and maintained. This information is contained, for the benefit of the owner, on a datasheet which specifies precisely what has been assigned in terms of fatigue as well as structural design assessment, construction monitoring and enhanced scantlings.
This kind of transparency - transparency of practice - is just as instrumental to the enhancement of safety in shipping as outward-facing transparency, if not more so. In the wake of Eriba, class has embraced both kinds, to the overall betterment of the industry.
The spectre of class liability
Erika undeniably changed the way in which the shipping industry operates, but it is possible that we are now entering a post Prestige phase which will change it further.One of the key issues for class post Prestige is liability. While class societies have in the past been subject to legal proceedings involving owners, operators, cargo interests and others, it now appears that future cases may be brought by governments, and there is a clear hardening in attitude by European Member States with respect to pollution, especially in light of the European Commission's (EC) proposed Directive on criminalising marine pollution.
The proposal for a Directive on ship source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences, states the following: '...the proposed Directive establishes that discharges in violation of Community laws shall constitute a criminal offence and that sanctions, including criminal sanctions, are to be imposed if the persons concerned have been found to have caused or participated in the act by intent or grossly negligent behaviour.
For natural persons this may include, in the most serious cases, the deprivation of liberty. The introduction of adequate sanctions for pollution offences is particularly important in relation to pollution by shipping, as the international civil liability regimes that govern ship-source pollution incidents involve significant shortcomings with respect to their dissuasive effects.'
The proposed Directive works on the assumption that the enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 is not strong or consistent enough and that the Civil Liability Conventions and their attendant Funds do not provide enough of a deterrent to would-be polluters. The proposed Directive is aimed as much at operational discharges of oil (in tank-cleaning operations, for example) as at large pollution incidents such as those which resulted from the sinkings of the Erika and the Prestige. The EC believes that the proposed Directive would give EMSA the legal basis to enforce MARPOL more effectively within European waters.
Future challenges
As dismaying as such legislative moves may be for the shipping industry, the EU will n° doubt continue to push new maritime safety measures through. If the industry, including class, is to move beyond the Erika and the Prestige, it must maintain an open dialogue with parties both within and without the industry and continue to improve safety and quality. Through IACS, and individually, classification societies have a role to play and can aid the industry in rising to the challenges presented by the new, post-Prestige era.
REGISTRO ITALIANO NAVALE
Ugo Salerno explains how scrutiny can enhance performance.A first thing that a classification society needs, when one of its classed ships suffers a major casualty, is a significant degree of humility. It has to be ready to take a long hard look at what it has done with respect to that ship, but also, and perhaps more significantly, how it runs its business overall. And it has to be ready to change if it needs to.
It is natural to be defensive when under pressure after an accident. But defensiveness entrenches problems. What is important is to be open, to see scrutiny as an opportunity and to use the external pressure as a tool for beneficial change.
That is easy to say, but hard to do when under intense media pressure. Every classification society has had this experience, some more than once.
RINA had that experience when the Erika sank in 1999. I'm glad to say we were able to learn a lot, not so much about that specific incident, but about how we ran the whole business. We took the positive decision to use the pressure to help us.
Several initiatives have been undertaken in the aftermath of the casualty to prevent similar accidents in the future. Among them, the EC has amended its Directive 94/57/EC on classification societies, emphasising the importance of safety and pollution prevention performance records measured in respect of all ships classed by a recognised organisation, irrespective of the flag they fly. Maintaining good records will be necessary to obtain EU recognition but also to continue to be recognised at community level.
RINA did not wait until the adoption of the Directive. Since the beginning of 2000, it has taken a long hard look at its management system, focusing on the achievement of high quality performance, over and above compliance with the applicable rules.
It has also taken advantage of the co-operation with the various bodies that scrutinised its quality system in 2000, namely the Italian Administration, the European Commission and IACS. In particular, the EC assessed RINA with respect to the provisions of Directive 94/57/EC and made recommendations and suggestions to improve the quality system.
The EC drew our attention to the detention statistics of PSC and requested RINA to improve its records by introducing a system of measuring its performance against clear targets, taking corrective actions where necessary.
As a consequence, since 2000, RINA has adopted initiatives related to organisation, personnel and procedures by focusing on improved services and performance of the classed fleet through several initiatives.
This included strengthening the RINA quality system by rationalising its organisation; strengthening the training and qualification of the exclusive surveyors; enhancing the quality of the RINA classed fleet through the adoption and implementation of the Special Surveillance Scheme (SSS) applied both to new entries and ships in service; and enhancing the procedures for preventing and targeting PSC detentions, by assessing the technical causes of detentions of RINA classed ships and offering advice to shipowners on how to maintain their vessels properly.
Successful implementation led to a significant improvement in the RINA performance in 2001 and 2002 in terms of measurable results. For example the strengthening of the RINA quality system is evident from the reduction in the number of non-conformities associated to aspects of 'work control' found during the external periodical audits carried out by IACS, which decreased by more than 50% from 2000 (18) to 2001.
Strengthening the training and qualification of exclusive surveyors can be measured in terms of more than 10 000 hours, from June 2001 to June 2002, dedicated to basic and advanced training courses for exclusive surveyors, dealing with matters relevant to class and statutory surveys, and associated monitoring of surveyors' activities in the field.
Enhancement of the quality of the RINA classed fleet, through the implementation of the SSS, has led to 379 ships, corresponding to a total of three million GT, having their class withdrawn at RINAs initiative in the three-year period. This has brought about a significant reduction in the average age of the classed fleet of oil tankers and bulk carriers.
The enhancement of the procedures for preventing and targeting PSC detentions, combined with the new initiatives, has led to a substantial reduction in classed ships detained worldwide by PSC, both in terms of total number of detentions and class-related detentions.
After the Erika, it seemed that everyone in shipping wanted to either blame RINA for the accident or examine what RINA was doing and why. Fortunately, we were able to see that as an opportunity, and we used that scrutiny to enhance our overall performance. If you ask me what class can learn from accidents, I can answer truthfully: "Quite a lot, as long as they are willing to learn."
BUREAU VERITAS
If nothing ever went wrong with ships, there would be n° need for classification societies, says a candid Philippe Boisson, Communications Director, Marine Division, Bureau Veritas.The sea is a tough place to work, and however good the original standards, the surveys, the maintenance and operation, ships will always have accidents. Class can't stop that, but they can make sure they are equipped to learn from those accidents, and so help prevent them happening again.
The aftermath of a major pollution incident is exactly when we should be learning lessons, but it is also unfortunately an emotive and difficult time to do that.
Not all accidents are major headline grabbing catastrophes, of course. Many are small incidents which are properly dealt with, and so don't become 'headline' disasters. And these are where class can learn a lot, because causes can be investigated and procedures and rules put under the microscope without legal and media pressure hampering the process.
BV has always investigated and studied the causes of damages to its classed ships, so that lessons can be learnt. But now a more formal approach will be instigated and maintained by a dedicated Damage and Repair Control Centre.
The Paris-based centre will collect and analyse survey and damage reports systematically, with the intention of identifying and monitoring trends, instigating and carrying out special technical investigations and becoming the focal point of knowledge with in the BV group.
Essentially, we shall be harnessing the power of information technology to help us see patterns and trends more clearly, and to see the accumulation of small incidents which are vital for learning.
Our aim must be to reduce the probability of an accident occurring from structural or machinery or equipment causes. And by learning from small incidents we can also do much to help design out human error.
A couple of years ago BV co-operated with Services et Transport, a French shipowner, to analyse the main causes of tanker accidents and major oil spills. We were able to clarify that the overwhelming majority of accidents were due to machinery failure, navigational error or fire and explosion, with hull damage low on the list.
That analysis led to the design of the Ecomax tanker, a double hulled vessel with fully redundant machinery and propulsion, with extra levels of fire prevention, plus enhanced navigational control. It has not been built yet, because the market has still to accept that high degree of redandancy and protection as a necessity. But it was a useful exercise in how class can learn from accidents, even if the accidents did not affect us directly.
Every update of our Rules contains the distilled experience of all our ships, all our surveyors, and all the years of operation of class. That probably explains why there are so few structural incidents. Rules for ship building are not made simply by pure calculation, they include a very significant degree of feedback.
Class is the only real reservoir of technical knowledge in shipping, which is why moves by some flag states and other bodies to have shipbuilding standards set by an international body, or by just a small group of class societies, are dangerous. Over the centuries of our existence, we have already learnt a lot from accidents. It would be a backward move for shipping to set up a new system, which would need to start learning all over again.
Source: IMarEST Review